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EUROPEAN INTEGRATION AND ETHNIC MOBILIZATION  
IN NEWLY ADMITTED COUNTRIES: 
 THE CASE OF HUNGARIAN MINORITY IN ROMANIA
♦ 
 
Laviania Bucsa
♣
 
 
  
    Our goal is territorial autonomy, not just cultural autonomy. (…) From 
now on, the European Parliament will become an important arena for our 
efforts aimed at gaining Hungarians’ rights.
1  
                                
                                         Marko Bela, President of the Democratic Union of   
                                                                                 Hungarians from Romania (UDMR) 
 
 
 
    We do not want a revision of borders, we will be content with territorial 
autonomy and this minimal requirement should be unequivocally supported 
by our (Hungarian) motherland.
2 
 
                                           Laszlo Tokes, Chairman of the National Council of  
                                                                           Hungarians from Transylvania 
           
I. Introduction 
 
Recently, Romania held its first elections for the European Parliament (EP).
3 Despite of what 
many public opinion researches have forecasted, Bishop Laszlo Tokes, the “hardliner” leader of 
the National Council of Ethnic Hungarians from Transylvania (CNMT), unexpectedly won a seat 
and became one of the three Hungarian minority’s representatives in the EP. During his electoral 
campaign, Tokes forcefully focused his discourse on the issue of territorial autonomy of the 
“Szeklers’ Region.”
4 Coupled with the debate on the reorganization of Romania’s development 
regions in the context of European integration, Tokes’ rhetoric won him the support of 3.4 
percent of the Hungarian electorate.  
       Similarly, Marko Bela, the moderate leader of the Democratic Union of Hungarians from 
Romania (UDMR) – the political organization that has been representing Hungarian minority’s 
interests since 1990 and from which CNMT split in 2003 – has radicalized his electoral discourse 
as well. Bela’s speeches at the launching the UDMR’s candidates for the EP elections underlined 
the determination of the UDMR politicians to “provide Hungarians from Transylvania the 
                                                           
     
♦ Paper presented at the University of Miami European Union Center for Excellence Symposium February 25, 2008 
on “the European Union and Regional Integration” 
     
♣ Lavinia Bucsa is a doctoral candidate of International Studies at Florida International University. 
     
1 UDMR’s President Marko Bela: “Statement-Program for European Parliamentary Elections,” March 3, 2007, 
available on-line (Romanian language) on UDMR’s web-site at: http://www.udmr.ro 
      
2 RFE/RL News, March 3, 2004. Tokes was also elected on June 16, 2006 as the first chairman-in-office of the 
newly formed Council for the Autonomy of Carpathian Region Magyars which include ethnic organizations from 
Romania, Croatia, Serbia, Montenegro, Slovenia, and Ukraine. 
     
3 Romania joined the EU on January 1, 2007; The EP elections were held on November 25, 2007 
     
4 This is a region in the western part of Transylvania (central Romania) consisting of three counties – Harghita, 
Covasna, Mures - in which Hungarian population represents the majority (about 70 percent of the population). 
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autonomy of the “Szeklers’ Land.”
5 He repeatedly declared that European Union (EU) must be 
build so that “Hungarian-Hungarian co-existence be perfect.” In addition, by using the EU’s 
“regionalization” theme, Bela proposed a new draft-law on Romania’s territorial reorganization 
which would re-establish the “Szecklers’ Region,” thereby de-centralizing the state’s power – a 
“viable and European-like project.”
6 This was a winning strategy, as UDMR managed to send 
two representatives of its own to Brussels. 
       The  territorial  autonomy  of  Transylvania has been a recurrent issue in post-communist 
Romanian politics. The nationalist rhetoric was heard constantly since 1990s, as both minority 
and majority elites played the “ethnic card” for electoral gains. However, what might be now 
surprising for many observers are the persistence and the relevance of the “autonomist” message 
in the new context of Romania’s EU membership.  
        Furthermore, the way this message has been framed by the Hungarian political elites – by 
using “European” themes such as “regionalization,” “Europe of the Regions,” “Catalan 
autonomist model” - raises an important question: is there a link between European integration 
and the radicalization of ethnic discourse? Does European integration affect ethnic mobilization 
and if so, how? This paper aims to address these questions by examining the case of Hungarian 
minority in Romania, through exploring the behavior of its political organizations (UDMR and 
CNMT), in the period from 1990 to present.
7 
       Some scholars have  argued that  political rhetoric is itself  political behavior.
8 Thus, as a 
methodological tool, and in order to illustrate the arguments that will be made, this research uses 
discourse analysis of interviews with major Hungarian leaders and other relevant actors, news, 
political platforms, etc. Data has been collected by accessing the news section of Lexis-Nexis 
Academic and News-Bank through FIU Library and also Romanian-language sources (major 
newspapers, official web-sites). 
      This  represent  exploratory  research  and, therefore, it has only a limited relevance. One 
limitation, among others, is that being a case-study approach, it does not allow generalizations. 
However, scholars
9 have pointed out that case-studies have the capacity to yield important 
theoretical gains by testing previous hypotheses from the literature, and to generate new 
theoretical insights.  
 
2. Theoretical Framework 
 
The link between European integration and minority mobilization in the newly admitted EU 
countries has received relatively little scholarly attention.
10 Although research on ethnic politics 
in Western Europe has led a number of scholars to argue that there is a growing link between 
European integration and minority mobilization, there is still little systematic research on whether 
                                                           
      
5 “ Romanian Hungarians’ Party Seeks EU Autonomy for Szeklerland,” BBC Monitoring Europe, 
October 22, 2007. Bela declared: “(…) for a century and a half our country (n.n. Transylvania) did not 
belong to us anymore. For the last time this country was lost in 1918 and our duty is to regain this lost 
territory.” 
      
6 Speech Marko Bela, October 12, Targu Mures, Romania, “Divers” newspaper, at: 
http://www.divers.ro 
      
7 In 2003 CNMT split from UDMR; in addition, the kin-state Hungary joined the EU in 2004 and 
Romania joined the Union in January 2007; thus the period from 2003 to present is particularly important 
because both the actors and the context in which they act are radically different from the previous period 
(1990-2000) 
      
8 V.P. Gagnon: “Ethnic Nationalism and International Conflict: The Case of Serbia,” 1995 
      
9 G. King, R. Keohane, S. Verba: “Designing Social Inquiry,” 1994 
     
10 An exception is S. Anagnostou, and A. Triandafyllidou: ”European Integration and Ethnic Minority 
Mobilization: A theoretical Introduction and Literature Review,” 2006. 
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and how “Europe” as a set of institutional resource and framing device has affected the actions 
and repertoires of ethnic minority movements in Central Eastern Europe (CEE).
11 
        In the context of Western Europe, a burgeoning literature has emerged around what has been 
termed “sub-national mobilization.”
12 More recent studies have analyzed the impact of European 
integration on ethno-regionalist parties
13 and whether the EU may actually encourage sub-
national autonomy movements.
14 By contrast, scholarship on post-Communist democratization 
pays a great deal of attention to the role of Western  (especially European) institutions, norms, 
and actors in compelling governments and minority groups to reach agreements on divisive 
issues, or to the evolution of state policies toward ethnic minorities.
15 Overall, this research has 
documented how (and to what degree) the EU, through its conditionality mechanisms, has offered 
frameworks for the regulation and management of ethnic relations in the post-communist Central 
and East European countries.  
        Recent literatures on Europeanization, regionalism and the “new nationalism,”
16 however, 
have suggested that the EU, through its minority rights and regionalization policies, and the 
tendency toward “multi-level governance,”
17 has created a transnational space for discourse and 
action in which minorities can now advance claims for self-determination and territorial 
autonomy. According to this line of reasoning, beside its beneficial impact on democratization 
process in CEE, the EU provides new political opportunities, for both “nations without states” 
and “national minorities,”
18 to project their identities within a wider political space, to operate 
within multiple arenas (local, regional, transnational/international) and  even to influence EU 
policies. 
         A relatively similar argument, coming from the literature on nationalism in CEE, posits that 
regional integrative processes significantly change domestic and  international opportunity 
structures for nationalist pursuit of political-cultural coherence (although, irredentist tendencies 
became inconceivable within EU), but integration does not cause nationalism to lose its 
relevance. Rather, old and new forms of nationalism coexist and mutually challenge and reinforce 
                                                           
      
11 For an exception see K. Harper and P. Vermeersch: “Great Expectations? “Europe” in Romani Activism,” 2002; 
P.Vermeersch: “The Romani Movement: Minority Politics and Ethnic Mobilization in Contemporary Central Europe,” 
2006 
      
12 See, for example, Hooghe, L: “Sub-national Mobilization in the European Union,” 1995; Hooghe, L.: ”Building 
an Europe with the Regions: The Changing Role of European Commission,” 1996; Jeffrey, C. (ed): ”The Regional 
Dimension of European Union,” 1997; Keating, M.: “The New Regionalism in Western Europe (…),” 1998; Le Gales, 
P. and Lequesne, C. (eds.): “Regions in Europe,” 1998 
      
13 De Winter: “ The Impact of European Integration on Ethno-regionalist Parties,” 2001 
      
14 S. Jolly. “How the EU Fuels Sub-National Regionalism,” 2007 
      
15 J. Kelly: “Ethnic Politics in Europe: The Power of Norms and Incentives,” 2004; Hughes, J. and Sasse, G.: 
“Monitoring the Monitors: EU Enlargement Conditionality and Minority Protection in CEE,” 2003; Vermeersch, P.: 
“EU Enlargement and Minority Rights Politics in Central Europe: Explaining Policy Shifts in the Czech Republic, 
Hungary, and Poland,” 2003; M.A. Vachudova.: “Europe Undivided: Democracy, Leverage and Integration after 
Communism,” 2005 
     
16 P. Lynch: “Minority Nationalism and European Integration,” 1996; Keating and McGarry: “Minority Nationalism 
and the Changing International Order,” 2001; Jones and Keating: “The European Union and the Regions,” 1995; 
Csergo and Goldgeier: “Nationalist Strategies and European Integration,” 2004; Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 
(eds.): “Europeanization of Central and Eastern Europe,” 2005; Lequesne and Le Gales (eds.): “Regions in Europe,” 
1998 
      
17 The term has become commonplace in EU studies in recent years and it is usually used to capture the peculiar 
qualities of the EU’s political system. The multi-level governance (MLG) proposes a picture of the EU policy process 
consisting of several tiers of authority (the European, national, and sub-national) and it also emphasizes the fluidity 
between these tiers, so that policy actors may move between different levels of action. Moreover, dispersion of 
authority is uneven across policy areas; at the same time, national governments remain important sites of authority. See 
Hooghe and Marks: “Multilevel Governance and European Integration,” 2001; Schmitter: “Imagining the future of the 
Euro-polity with the help of new concepts, “1996; The MLG’s claim represents a direct challenge to theories such as 
Moravsick’s liberal intergovernmentalism. See Moravcsik “Preferences and power in the European community: a 
liberal intergovernmentalist approach,” 1993; Rosamond: “Theories of European integration,” 2000. 
     
18 M. Keating: “European Integration and the Nationalities Question,” 2003 
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one another in a complex and dynamic process that shapes the direction of integration
19 (since the 
recent enlargement to the east significantly shifts the balance within the Union among states and 
groups pursuing different types of nationalism). 
        The behavior of the Hungarian minority in Romania, particularly in the last four years, 
seems to illustrate these insights relatively well. In order to appeal to their constituency, the 
leaders of the Hungarian minority, both moderates and hardliners, framed their demands in 
“European terms,” and also acted on multiple political arenas. At the domestic level, territorial 
autonomy became a powerful rhetorical device for ethnic mobilization by elites in their struggle 
for winning electoral contests (both minority-majority and, later, intra-organizational contests). 
Hungarian political elites have used the dual, and sometimes ambiguous, provisions of the EU 
minority rights and regionalization regimes as a vehicle for projecting their identities and group 
interests within a wider, “European,” political space.  
        At the supra-national level, through membership in European parliamentary party-groups 
(such as the European People’s Party-PPE, the first declared “transnational” party, and favoring a 
federalist view of the EU) and other trans-national organizations (e.g. Unrepresented Nations and 
Peoples Organization/UNPO, the ethnic Hungarian leaders have tried, and continue to try, to 
influence the European discourse and policies in the field of minority rights and regionalism, and 
therefore to make them more compatible with Hungarians’ “historical aspirations.”  
       Moreover, aided by the successive governments of the kin-state (Hungary), and recently by 
Viktor Orban, the chairman of the Hungarian opposition party FIDESZ, Hungarian leaders from 
Romania attempted (though only with limited success so far) to weaken the central state’s control 
over the region in which Hungarian minority represents the majority of the population. They have 
tried to exercise pressure on the state not only “from below,” through the mechanisms of electoral 
politics, but also “from above.”  
       In the light of the above discussion, this paper suggests that the “multi-level games” played 
by Hungarian leaders, despite being influenced by domestic circumstances and intra-
organizational competition, were facilitated (or mediated) by the EU accession and integration 
processes. The complexity of EU and the existence of competing views for the future of Europe - 
that is, intergovernmental vs. federalist/“Europe of the Regions”- have enabled minority leaders 
to take a flexible approach to Europe. They have promoted a certain understanding of “Europe,” 
(one that “fits” their aspirations and goals) and so have found opportunities to use EU policies 
and institutional developments to assist their demands for autonomy and to mobilize their 
electorate. Paradoxically, by leveraging minorities through the EU conditionality mechanisms in 
the accession period, European integration became itself, unintentionally, a potential motive for 
group radicalization.       
        The  leaders  of  Hungarian  minority’s political organizations are increasingly seeking to 
exploit the process of European integration to assist their domestic political demands by adopting 
a range of “linkage strategies,” which are reactions to developments within the European Union 
that can be grafted on to the political discourse of nationalism. Thus, European integration is 
treated as a political resource to bolster demands for autonomy. Before I turn to the examination 
of the practice of this linkage, a brief discussion of the historical context of inter-ethnic relations 
in Transylvania will be presented next. 
                                                           
       
19 Csergo and Goldgeier: “Nationalist Strategies and European Integration,” 2004. The nationalist 
strategies that the authors delineate are: traditional (nation-state), sub-state (pertaining the ethnic groups, 
i.e. Hungarian minority), transsovereign, and protectionist. Of particularly importance is the transsovereign 
type, which has as main objective “the creation of institution to link nation across state borders.” According 
to the authors, the nation-building strategy of Hungary (“virtual nationalism”) after 1990 exemplifies this 
approach best.  
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2.1. Ethnic relations in context: history, democratization and European integration  
 
Transylvania, the western part of Romania which comprises the Hungarian minority, has been 
historically regarded as a homeland by both Romanians and Hungarians (Magyars) groups. The 
beginning of the eighteen century found Transylvania integrated into the Hapsburg Empire, as a 
self-governing unit, and from 1867 the province belonged to Hungary within the framework of 
Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. After the First World War (with the provisions established by the 
Treaty of Trianon), Romania acquired Transylvania and, with it, a sizable Hungarian population 
which became “national minority.”  
        So, Transylvania entered the age of nation-building facing the consequences of competition 
between two “parallel discourses of legitimacy”
20 – the Hungarian and the Romanian ones – both 
of which have claimed state-building rights for their own nation. The long term result has been 
that “national territory” became an essential element of cultural identity; and a mutually exclusive 
perception of national interests has led to the polarization of society along ethnic lines. Unlike the 
Roma or other smaller ethnic minorities living in Transylvania, the Hungarian community does 
have a strongly developed and fully integrated sense of regional national identity. This includes 
the perception of its own historically constituted territorial basis, which for Hungarians 
legitimates the claims for autonomy. 
       The breakdown of the Romanian communist regime in 1989 created a new environment for 
the different processes of national institutionalization, now in a democratic framework. However, 
the national projects of the titular nation (Romanian) and that of Hungarian minority found 
themselves into an antagonistic situation - and also generated the active engagement by the 
governments of the neighboring Hungary. The Romanian state defended the internationally 
recognized principle of sovereignty and defined Romania as a “unitary nation-state.” In a similar 
logic, Hungarian leaders used the discourse of minority rights and self-determination to assert 
their rights for cultural and territorial autonomy. 
       The transition from communism and the process of constructing democratic political systems 
saw a widespread mobilization of historical minorities in the entire CEE region. Ethnic parties 
were created and, as in the case of UDMR in Romania, they have participated, since the mid 90s, 
in governmental coalitions. In addition, minority claims and demands have been implicitly or 
explicitly defended (and promoted as a condition for membership) by European organizations 
such as the Council of Europe seeking to diffuse nationalist tensions and prevent conflict. It 
follows that Hungarian minority’s assertion and politicization after 1990 was not only made 
possible by democratization, but has also been encouraged by the emerging European human 
rights and minority protection regime.  
       Finally,  in  the  more  recent  context of implementing the EU structural/cohesion policy – 
which requires devolution of power to regional and sub-national units, thereby challenging, 
indirectly, the national socio-political and cultural boundaries - regional administrative reforms 
required by the EU open up a greater space for and revitalized mobilization among local and 
regional actors, including ethnic parties.  
       These unresolved dilemmas (i.e. how to accommodate the principles of sovereignty in a 
multinational context, in a way that satisfies the requirements of equality and inclusions) that the 
new members of the EU bring with them are not unique to the post-communist societies, but the 
divisiveness of these questions is more apparent in the CEE context and this makes the Hungarian 
elites’ current discourse radicalization even more salient. Although Europe does give countries a 
new framework within which issues of nationality, self-government and self-determination can be 
negotiated, it does not provide a (definitive) answer to the “nationalities questions.” Europe lacks 
a clear normative basis, one that applies in similar ways to both the eastern and the western part 
of the continent, and some fear that it thus might become a merely arena for group competition. 
                                                           
      
20 Flora: “Competing Cultures, Conflicting Identities: The Case of Transylvania,” 2001 
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2.2. Concepts: definitions & clarifications 
 
Different strands of literature describe the phenomenon of minority mobilization under various 
and sometimes confusing terms (i.e. “minority radicalization,” “ethno-nationalism,” “sub-state 
nationalism)”; it would be therefore useful to clarify the concepts I use. 
        First, mobilization has been defined as the process by which an ethnic community (group)
21 
becomes politicized on behalf of its collective interests and aspirations.
22 This process requires 
awareness, usually promoted by “ethnic entrepreneurs,” that political action is necessary to 
promote the community’s vital interests. Mobilization is a dynamic process that varies in 
intensity at different times: it may rise and fail, but seldom disappears;
23 hence, the necessity to 
identify the conditions that trigger and maintain mobilizing efforts. 
        Secondly, in the CEE context, in which the implications of the presence or the absence of a 
kin-state are significant, scholars have made the distinction between “external,” “transnational” 
and “indigenous” minorities.
24 For the purpose of this analysis, “external” minorities are those 
minorities that, while living on the territory of one-state (“host-state”) are ethnically akin to the 
titular nation of another, often neighboring state (kin-state). A related observation refers to the 
fact that, confronting the threat to, or the opportunity for self-identification and uniqueness leads 
to ethnic identity being politicized, that is, to the ethnic group being a political actor by virtue of 
its shared ethnic identity. Consequently, ethnic groups, especially if they are in a perceived 
situation of disadvantage, make demands that reflect both the historic continuities as well as 
perceived opportunities.
25 
       Thirdly, as I have explained earlier, in the CEE, the link between ethnicity and territory have 
a particular resonance and are linked to the notion of power. In the literature of nationalism as a 
form of politics, the concept of nationalism expresses the desire of an ethnic group to gain 
political power.
26 Brubaker understands nationalism as “a form of remedial action.”
27  Other 
scholars prefer the term “ethno-politics,” as a more inclusive concept, encompassing aspirations 
for self-determination and the congruence of culture with polity but short of the creation of a 
nation-state. It also includes politics that are non-conflictual.
28    
        Lastly, a group demand or claim is defined as “a bid by minority representatives against the 
center for a degree of control over state institutions.”
29  It follows that minority radicalization 
denotes the collective expression of, or support for more extreme demands by the minority 
constituents. Minority radicalization is operationalized as the extremity of collective demands that 
minority representatives advance against the center.
30 Furthermore, a group can be said to “make” 
a particular demand if it is put forward by the party of political leaders who enjoy broad support 
                                                           
      
21 Following Horowitz, an ethnic group can be defined as a community whose membership is based on the 
possession of a trait that is taken to be ascriptive and thus largely inherited. Horowitz: “Ethnic Groups in Conflict,” 
1985.  
       
22 Esman: “Ethnic Politics,” 1994 
       
23 Kantor: The  Status Law Syndrome and Regional/National Identity: Hungary, Hungarians in Romania, and 
Romania,”2006 
       
24 Wolff: “Beyond Ethnic Politics in Central and Eastern Europe,” 2002. Also, Keating, makes another distinction 
between “stales nations,” groups who see themselves as a distinct nationality but have no state of their own, being 
contained within a state dominated by another nationality (i.e. Basque and Catalans in Spain) and “national 
minorities,”—groups within a state who identify with a titular nation of another state (e.g. Hungarians from Romania 
and Slovakia, or Irish nationalists in Northern Ireland).  
      
25 M. Keating: “European Integration and the Nationalities Question,” 2003 
      
26 Smith, A.: National Identity, 1991  
      
27 Brubaker: “Nationalism Reframed,” 1996 
      
28 Rotschild :”Ethnopolitics: A Conceptual framework, 1981 
      
29 Erin Jenne: “Ethnic Bargaining: The Paradox of Minority Empowerment,” 2007 
      
30 Ibid. Jenne measures the extremity of group’s demands along a continuum, with secession and irredentism as the 
more extreme and minor claims such as affirmative action as the least extreme. Demands for territorial autonomy 
constitute, obviously, a greater challenge than those for cultural autonomy. 
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within minority rank and file. Group demands are tied to minority radicalization because ethnic 
demands enjoy legitimacy in the international discourse and therefore help mobilize international 
support for minority’s cause. 
 
2.3. Theoretical insights on ethnic mobilization and on the EU’s impact on sub-state actors’  
       Behavior 
 
There are many factors that have a direct impact on ethnic mobilization, and they are generally 
classified in two broad categories: internal and external/environmental. For example, structural 
factors such as group size, location, and territorial compactness are determinant of the nature of 
claims a group can advance.
31 However, scholars have shown “that movements develop in 
response to an ongoing process of interaction between movement groups and the larger 
sociopolitical environment they seek to change.”
32  
     Insights from the social movement literature shows that the prospects of ethnic mobilization 
are dependent on the changes in the institutional political system, the availability of 
organizational structures around ethnic identity, and the presence of powerful schemes of 
interpretation conducive to ethnic mobilization. This strand of literature regards as important the 
activities of those who present themselves as leaders of ethnic minorities, their resources, and 
their ability to make public claims in the name of the minority. Two elements are relevant: 
“political opportunity structure” and “framing” (defined as “the conscious strategic effort by 
groups of people to fashion a shared understanding of reality, and intentionally choose a frame for 
mobilization”).
33 
        Peter Eisinger defines political opportunity structure as “elements in the environment that 
impose certain constrains on political activity or opens avenues for it.”
34 According to Sidney 
Tarrow, collective action is enabled by the expansion of the political opportunity structure, 
defined as “consistent – but not necessarily formal, permanent, or national – dimensions of the 
political struggle that encourage people to engage in contentious politics.”
35 Moreover, political 
opportunity structure may occur when a government liberalize or when its rulers become 
preoccupied with foreign engagements.
36  
        Political opportunities theorists draw our attention to such matters as leadership, networks,
37 
allies, and political and institutional opportunities as central elements for ethnic mobilization. 
Another area of influence that has not attracted much attention in the study of ethnic movements 
is the international environment. In general, much of the literature takes domestic states as the 
principal referents. However, in the CEE context, ethnic mobilization cannot be understood 
without taking the international context into account. 
         In this respect, Erin Jenne
38 has proposed an “ethnic bargaining model,” which posits that 
group radicalization is driven by shifting perceptions of relative power against the center. These 
perceptions are informed both by changes in the institutional opportunity structure and by the 
actions of the group’s external lobby actor, defined as “a kin-state, or any powerful state, 
organization (e.g. EU) interest group, etc. that intervenes or threatens to intervene of behalf of the 
minority against its host government.”
39 For instance, a diplomatic intervention by a homeland 
                                                           
      
31 Mikesell and Murphy: “ A Framework for Comparative Study of Minority Group Aspirations,” 1991 
      
32 Mc Adam: “Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency,” 1982. In a similar vein, Milton Esman 
has argued that ethnic mobilization is a consequence of mixed motives and incentives. See “Ethnic Politics,” 1994 
      
33 McAdam et al.,: “Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements: Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures 
and Cultural Framing,” 1996 
     
34 P. Eisinger: “The Conditions of Protest Behavior in American Cities,” 1973 
     
35 S.Tarrow: “Power in Movement: Social Movements, Collective Action and Politics,” 1998 
     
36 Ibid. 
     
37 T. Risse, K.Sikkink: “The Socialization of International Human Rights Norms into Domestic Practices,” 1999 
      
38 E. Jenne: “Ethnic Bargaining: The Paradox of Minority Empowerment,” 2007 
     
39 Ibid. 
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state may lead minority representative to believe that they enjoy leverage against the center and 
therefore to escalate their demands for territorial autonomy Thus, according to Jenne’s theory, by 
leveraging the minority, the opportunity structure is itself a potent motive for group 
radicalization. Jenne argues that the EU only indirectly can influence minority behavior by 
altering the preferences of the group’s host and lobby states. 
        Two types of opportunity structures are most important, according to Jenne. The first is the 
institutional opportunity structure—defined as the transient political environment that emerges, 
often unexpectedly, to alter the balance of power between the minority and the center.
40 The 
second type refers to the discursive opportunity structures, which are generally more malleable, 
and adaptable to a range of settings. They inform not only the legitimate forms of political 
organization, but also the means by which the actors can pursue their goals. 
        Other illuminating arguments come from the literatures on regionalism and Europeanization, 
which is vast and, in general, signal the role of regions and other sub-national actors in European 
politics.
41 Jones and Keating, for example conclude that power relations within member states 
can change under European impact. They argue that the combination of European opportunities 
and regional activism results in a differentiated pattern of shifts in central-local relations. Other 
articles show that EU cohesion policy “has not left relations between central and sub-national 
actors undisturbed.”
42 Finally, the literature on Europeanization
43 shows that, as the overall 
direction of EU is toward the devolution of competencies both up to the EU-level, and down to 
regions (“multi-level governance”), domestic actors use Europeanization as an opportunity to 
further their goals. 
        Lastly,  one  recent  study  suggests  the importance of political opportunities at the 
transnational level. Peter Vermeersch
44 shows that the European integration process and the 
emergence of transnational organizations working on issues such as human rights provided 
Romani (Gypsy) activists with ideological and material resources that helped sustain their ethnic 
mobilization attempts. In other words, Romani mobilization was influence by both domestic 
policies and institutions and by an international political opportunity structure.  
     Overall, these studies concludes that, although we should not take the supranational European 
level as the predominant realm of influence on minority mobilization, it is important to notice 
that domestic ethnic mobilization in the CEE was, at particular times, determined by the attention 
devoted to it in the realm of European politics. 
      
3. EU Opportunity Sructure  
 
This section examines the more concrete opportunity structures that Europe offers for satisfying 
nationality claims by means short of independence. As I have mentioned, there is a general 
consensus that the emerging European order is complex and multilayered, with a range of 
continental bodies not all of which have the same territorial coverage. There is the Council of 
Europe, European Parliament, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, as well 
as a range of inter-state and inter-regional bodies. Although there is no place for what Keating has 
called “stateless nations” and national minorities, there may be opportunities to play various 
roles.
45 By gaining representation in the national Parliaments, as happened with most ethnic 
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41 B. Johnes and M.Keating: “The European Union and the Regions,” 1995 
      
42 L. Hooghe (ed): “Cohesion Policy and European Integration: Building Multi-Level Governance,” 1996 
      
43 Conceptually, “Europeanization” is defined as “the emergence and the development at the European level of 
distinct structures of governance.” See: Cowles, Caporaso, Risse (eds.): “Transforming Europe: Europeanization and  
Domestic Change,” 2001 
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Europe,” 2006 
      
45 Keating: “European Integration and the Nationalities Questions,” 2003 
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parties after 1990 in CEE, minorities gain direct access to the supranational level through their 
delegates in the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe. The European opportunities 
and instruments that could be used by minorities are mostly of two types: (1) opportunities for 
regions in Europe and (2) minority rights regimes. 
         In the early 90s, there was a lot of interest in the concept of a “Europe of the Regions.” This 
was never clearly specified, but, according to Keating, it seemed to refer to “an order in which 
regions were recognized as a third level of government alongside with states and the European 
Union itself.”
46 Although regions and minorities were too heterogeneous ever to fit into such a 
scheme, in practice, the Europe of Regions evolved into a series of opportunities to intervene in 
EU policy making, either by direct links to Brussels or via the member states. 
                A clause in the 1992 Treaty on European Union allows regional ministers to represent 
member states in the Council of Ministers where domestic law provides for this.
47 This is applied 
in Germany, Austria, Belgium, and the UK in various ways. Thus, while European “high 
policymaking” remains largely intergovernmental, the treaties do provide mechanisms whereby 
regions can become actors, obviously, provided that they succeed in enforcing their demands in 
domestic constitution-building. 
        Another mechanism established by the Treaty of EU is the Committee of the Regions. For 
regionalists and minority nationalist, this has proved a disappointment because of its weak 
powers and lack of resources and because it represents all levels of sub-member state 
governments on a basis of equality.
48 Dissatisfaction with this latter feature, which puts 
municipalities and strong regions on the same footing, led federated units and “stateless nations” 
to seek recognition of their place in the European constitution by advancing the initiative Regions 
with Legislative Powers.
49 A parallel initiative is the alliance of Constitutional Regions, which 
involves the same players but originates in the Council of Ministers.
50 Although neither initiative 
corresponds to cultural or national minorities, there is enough of an overlap to make common 
cause in asserting the need for a regionalized level within the European architecture. German 
Landers, Italian regions, Scotland, Wales, Flanders, and Catalonia have been involved in these 
initiatives. 
        Structural Funds have been also given a lot of attention, as a means of giving regions direct 
access to Brussels, a partnership with the Commission, and a source of funding independent of 
the member states. In practice, however, the management of the funds is largely dominated by the 
states. As Keating has suggested,
51 the funds should be perhaps best seen as an arena for 
symbolic politics, in which regional and local politicians can claim to have established a funding 
link to Brussels. 
                                                          
       Beyond the formal bodies of the EU and the Council of Ministers, there is a range of inter-
regional bodies and networks, which further reinforce the concept of a European political space 
for regions, and encourage minorities to enter the European game. For example, one important 
opportunity lies in cross-border cooperation, which is encouraged both by the EU and by the 
Council of Europe. However, while in the new Europe borders have much lost their functional 
rationale, they still have symbolic importance as expressions of state sovereignty—as I have 
discussed previously. 
       The  EU  in  conjunction  with  the  Council of Europe (CoE) has emphasized a variety of 
methods for protecting minority cultural and political rights in the process of integrating CEE 
states. The CoE Recommendation no. 1201 of 1993 advocated that regionally concentrated 
minorities have the right to special status of local autonomy -- which had become a point of 
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friction between Hungary and Romania (and Slovakia). Through the 1990, EU economic 
assistance, co-operation, trade preferences vis-à-vis CEE has regularly been linked, directly or 
indirectly, to respect for human rights and minorities. 
        With the signing of association agreements between the EU and CEE candidate states in 
1997-98, the European Commission has given considerable attention to minority rights in its 
assessment and opinion of the latter.
52 In the Regular Reports on Progress toward Accession, the 
Commission has devoted sections to issues such as minority language and education, political and 
social discrimination, etc. in reference to minorities in Romania, Slovakia and Bulgaria. The EU 
has even tied its aid through the PHARE program to the Copenhagen political conditions of 
respect for human rights and the protection of minorities. Nonetheless, as I have suggested, the 
lack of a firm foundation in EU law and concise benchmarks for minority protection means that 
what constitute minority and minority rights remains unclear and there are different 
interpretations of what implementation and protection of minorities may mean.
53 
 
4. The EU’s Impact on the Behavior of the Hungarian Minority  
 
4.1. Democratization and EU accession: 1990-2003 
 
In analyzing ethnic movements, scholars often focus on concrete organizations that are the main 
protagonists of an activated ethnic minority. The organizational expression of ethno-politics and a 
factor that usually plays a crucial role in the evolution of inter-ethnic relations is the ethnic party, 
in my analysis, the Hungarian Democratic Union of Romania (UDMR).
54 However, at least two 
other actors became visible after 2003, as it will be shown later: the Civic Alliance of Hungarians 
(UCM),
55 and the National Council of Hungarians from Transylvania (CNMT). 
              Founded immediately after the fall of the communist regime, UDMR is the interest 
protection “alliance” of the various territorial and political organizations of Hungarian minority in 
Romania. Ethnic Hungarians represent its only electoral base and, for that matter Hungarian 
group is renowned for its disciplined electoral behavior. Unlike the Hungarians in Slovakia, the 
Hungarians in Romania, from the beginning of post-Communist transformation, overwhelmingly 
supported a single Hungarian political organization.  
       In part due to the political abilities of its leader Marko Bela (which include a moderate, 
flexible, gradual approach to the “ethnic issue” and territorial autonomy), and in part due to the 
Romanian’s regime adversarial nationalism before 1996, UDMR was remarkably successful in 
commanding the majority of Hungarian minority votes in every parliamentary elections since 
1990 and so it remained the only Hungarian political organization until 2003.  
       A center-right party, linked to the Christian Democratic Movement and European People’s 
Party, UDMR articulated the view of “Europe of the Regions.” UDMR has also emphasized its 
“European mission,” which allowed President Marko Bela to claim that Hungarians are both 
constituent element of the Romanian state and “an organic part of a wider Hungarian nation.
56 As 
such, UDMR leaders have always claimed the right to cultivate relations with the “mother 
country” across the border, and this affirmation led Romanian nationalists to call into question 
Hungarians’ loyalty to the Romanian state.  
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      From the beginning of the 1990s, UDMR constantly challenged the unitary nation-state model 
by defining Romanian state as multinational and Hungarian minority as a “national community,” 
thus entitled to an equal partnership with titular nation. Based on this concept, the UDMR, from 
1993 on, asked for constitutional guarantees of collective political rights, which centered on the 
right to unrestricted use of the Hungarian language in the institutions of self-government and 
those of cultural reproduction. The aim was to establish the institutions in which Hungarians 
could live their social and public life in Hungarian.
57 
        To conclude, UDMR demands collective rights for Hungarians as a national minority, and it 
demands autonomy, including territorial autonomy, not only cultural and linguistic rights. 
However, the demand for territorial autonomy was not voiced with the same intensity over time. 
Throughout the 1990s, UDMR mostly engaged in heated language contestations (and education) 
with Romanian elites. At that point in time, territorial autonomy did not enjoy the backing of 
Hungarian government. In addition, Romanian elites, until 1996 (when the Iliescu regime was 
removed from power) were not on a firm path toward EU membership, despite their declared 
intentions to seek NATO and EU-membership. 
       Regarding  the  meaning  of  “autonomous communities” and the forms of “internal-self 
determination,” the UDMR draft-bill provided the following explanation: “National identity is a 
fundamental human right and both individuals and communities are equally entitled to it;”  “(…)  
The national minorities and autonomous communities together with Romanian nation are 
political subjects and state-forming communities;” “(…) National minorities that define 
themselves as autonomous communities shall have the right to personal autonomy (…) as well as 
to self-government and regional autonomy.”
58 According to President Marko Bela, “autonomy is 
not an end but a means of maintaining a separate (Hungarian) language, culture, and national 
identity.”
59 
       As the Romania and Hungary were negotiating the bilateral treaty, and as talks threatened to 
stall over minority issues once again (it took more then five years of negotiation for the treaty to 
be signed in 1996), Marko Bela escalated the demands for territorial autonomy where “compact 
Hungarian population lives.”
60 He called on Hungary to insist that provisions for such 
arrangements be included in the Treaty, and he received assurance from the Hungarian prime 
minister that Budapest would continue to support autonomy for ethnic Hungarians in Romania. 
Laszlo Tokes went even further, proposing that Romania devolve power to Hungarian regions 
“along the lines of South Tyrol.”
61 
       Although this is a very rough description, the period from 1990 to 2000 centered mostly on 
issue of multilingualism and education in native tongue. International (EU, OSCE) influences 
were sifted through domestic lenses, and elite domestic calculations changed according to 
international opportunity structures. European norms themselves evolved in the process and 
European officials that took part in debates over language use represented the EU as an evolving 
institutional framework with its own dilemmas regarding multilingualism 
       The dominant political elites in Romania, Hungary, as well as the Hungarian minority sought 
membership in the EU, yet they have different visions about and expectations from this 
institution. Hungarian minority wanted to weaken the control of the state over minority cultural 
reproduction and aimed at internationalizing/“Europeanizing” minority policy. Partly through the 
Hungarian government as a mediator and partly by taking advantage of the absence of clear EU-
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level policies,
62 they pressed for a comprehensive European legal regime that would recognize 
minority rights and enforce them throughout a unified Europe. 
              The primacy of stability and security concerns limited the EU opportunities for the 
Hungarian minority’s institutional autonomy. On the one hand, the EU officials called on post-
communist governments to weaken centralized control over their societies and allow regional and 
local self-government. At the same time, they were hesitant about empowering national 
minorities to make institutional claims against the state. EU and CE officials avoided advocating 
federalism and other sub-state versions of territorial autonomy available to national minorities in 
several Western states.
63 
       When in 1993 the Council of Europe issued Recommendation no.1201,
64 which included an 
article encouraging states to allow the formation of self-governments, Hungarian minority elites 
regarded it as a legitimization of their demands for collective rights, while majority elites 
vehemently rejected it.  The flexibility of Western norms allowed minority (and majority) 
political actors to choose from different institutional designs and policy alternatives, and thus to 
frame and promote them (discursively) as they saw fit. For example, while Romanian elites were 
interested in examples of a “minimalist” interpretation of “European norm,” on minority 
accommodation, promoting the French model, Hungarian minority elites looked to examples of 
minority institutional autonomy, such as in the case of Catalans in Spain or German-speakers in 
South Tyrol. My research shows that Hungarian leaders, especially the “radical wing” lead by 
Tokes, embraced these models and always used them in political debates over minority rights that 
took place in both domestic and international arenas. 
       
4. 2. Almost there: Hopes for Territorial Autonomy renewed: 2003-Present 
 
In 1996, UDMR became part of the governmental coalition. From this time until 2000, although 
he never renounced the autonomy desiderate, Marko Bela’s discourse was mostly moderate. In 
contrast, Bishop Laszlo Tokes, the Catholic priest who sparked the Romanian Revolution of 1989 
and who represented the radical voice in UDMR from its inception, completely disagreed with 
this approach to the “minority issue.” As part of the non-parliamentary group of the Union, Tokes 
stated his demands clearly: a separate Hungarian University in the City of Cluj (Transylvania), 
new property law, and territorial autonomy for Szekler’s Region (the three counties with 
Hungarian population in majority).  
      Following the continuation of the moderate line maintained by UDMR (as a result of the 
adoption, in 2001 of the Law on Local Administration which granted minorities the right to use    
their tongue in relationship with authorities), the radical faction constituted its own organization, 
the so-called Reformist Bloc. It proposed changing the constitution (the abolition of article 1 
which defines Romania as “national unitary state,” arguing that the term “absolute sovereignty” 
of the state be replaced by the term “limited sovereignty,”
65 and thus the recognition of the 
multinational character of the Romanian state. 
              By adopting an “EU-like” language the president of the Reformist Bloc declared at a 
Hungarian forum that territorial autonomy for regions inhabited by ethnic Hungarians is “the only 
solution” for setting the problem of this minority. In his view, the autonomy could be achieved 
through the establishments of “Euro-regions” on the territory of the three counties that compose 
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the “Szeckler’ region.” The reformist movement culminated in 2003, when Tokes constituted a 
separate Hungarian organization – the National Council of Ethnic Hungarians from Transylvania.  
        The evolution of minority behavior in the period from 2004 to present could be understood 
as a continuation, by similar means, of the “multilevel-games” played in the past. However, our 
major actors found themselves in a new context, which posed both new opportunities and 
constraints. Firstly, Hungary joined the EU in 2004. Secondly, as the prospects for the 2007 
accession became favorable Romanian elites continued to be under EU pressure to fulfill the pre-
accession requirements, which included better minority rights. In these circumstances, Tokes was 
determined to continue promoting the goal of territorial autonomy. He made numerous visits to 
Hungary, met and lobbied with representatives of different European parties, and declared at 
every occasion (domestic and international arenas) that “the autonomy of Szeklers’ Region is the 
key to safeguard Hungarians.”
66  
        In addition, Tokes stressed that this would be in accordance with prevalent views within the 
EU regarding the future shape of the Union, in which diversity and the principles of 
multilingualism and collective minority rights should be encouraged and supported. This was not 
really an accurate description of the EU norms and policies; however, it is another instance that 
illustrates how Hungarian politicians used “linkage strategies” and adapted European themes 
either to press for autonomy, or to gain electoral contests. 
        On June 16, 2004, Tokes created another Hungarian political organization – the Hungarian 
Autonomy Council in Carpathian Basin, a sort of transnational body including ethnic 
organizations form six neighboring countries – with the purpose of promoting the idea of 
autonomy “from below.” The Council does not have a single conception of autonomy but instead, 
it represents at European forums all the Hungarian communities’ autonomy concepts as they are. 
The Bloc intention is to obtain “Euro-region” status and, according to Tokes, the same 
competencies and institutions as possessed by those “autonomous communities in the EU that 
enjoy territorial autonomy, Catalonia in Spain, for example.”
67 For this purpose, in 2004 the 
representatives of the Council requested from the European Parliament to make the creation of an 
autonomous Szeklers’ region a precondition for Romania’s accession to EU.
68 
        For Romanian elites territorial autonomy on ethnic basis is out of question as it contradicts 
the Constitution and “is no longer on the European agenda.” There is an indirect pressure from 
EU, however, to reform the old administrative divisions of the country in order to better benefit 
from the structural funds. In fact, in 1992, eight such regions were created, not on ethnic basis 
and the Hungarian politicians contest them. Recently, the representatives of the Council of the 
Szeklers Region referred to the Recommendation 1811 of European Council Parliamentary 
Assembly of which they said: “it gives us hope that we can count on Europe in our struggle for 
autonomy (of Szeklers Region).”
69 
       Months before the EP elections, Marko Bela radicalized his discourse as well, as I have 
already shown at the beginning of this paper. Bela declared that the Hungarian minority needs to 
use the EU’s minority rights regime and regionalization policy as vehicles for promoting their 
aspirations.
70 UDMR proposed in October 2007 a new draft-law on Romania’s regionalization 
and Bela wanted to stir a national debate on the country’s territorial division into economic 
development regions. He mentioned that the reorganization of the economic development regions 
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(on an ethnic basis) might even set up a network of regional parliaments following examples and 
(Western) European patterns.
71 
       After his victory in the EP elections, Tokes declared that the claim for territorial autonomy of 
the Szeklers Region is now even more legitimate at both domestic and EU levels.
72  In addition, 
Tokes’ well-know friendship with the former Hungarian prime-minister Victor Orban, a populist-
nationalist leader, and the vice-president of the European People’s Party (PPE-ED),
73 not only 
raised suspicions among Romanian nationalists but, in the context of the recent “Kosovo crisis,” 
it also raised interesting questions about the future developments/direction of the EU. 
        A final comment should be made on the politics of kin-state Hungary. The limited space of 
this paper does not allow a detailed discussion. However, it would be worth noting a couple of 
things. First, my research indicated that all Hungarian parties that took turn in government after 
1990 considered “care for Hungarians abroad,” as articulated in the article 6 of Hungarian 
Constitution, an important goal. Particularly the governments of Prime-ministers Antall from, 
1990 to 1993, and Viktor Orban, from 1998 to 2002, considered Hungarian minorities first and 
foremost to be part of the Hungarian cultural nation, and as such were much involved in 
promoting their demands and supporting their aspirations.  
       Second,  one  indirect,  but  consistent mode of Hungarian influence on neighboring 
governments’ minority policies was the attempt to “Europeanize” Hungarian minority issues. 
Arguing that minority rights constitute a common European value, consecutive Hungarian 
governments lobbied European institutions on behalf of Hungarian minority parties and pressed 
for the inclusion of minority rights article in the EU’s Constitution.
74 Later, they used the general 
European trend toward devolution and regionalism to argue for the right to local and regional 
self-government for Hungarian minorities.  
       Third, institutions that provide channels for relations between Hungarian across the borders 
such as Governmental Office for Hungarians Abroad were created immediately after 1989 and 
these institutions continued their activities despite frequent shifts in government.  At the same 
time, the activities of Hungarian officials frequently included visits, meetings, conferences, 
focusing on ways of strengthening ethnic Hungarian’s institutions. 
 
5. Conclusions  
 
After the fall of communism in CEE, many Western theorists and policymakers expected that the 
desire for democratization and European integration would help weaken the traditional appeal of 
nationalism and that, in an integrated “Europe without borders,” minorities’ demands for 
territorial autonomy will become superfluous. Yet, as the case of the Hungarian minority in 
Romania shows, reality confronts us with a more nuanced picture: while the EU’s conditionality 
mechanism has contributed to undermining violent nationalism, claims for self-determination and 
territorial autonomy are still being voiced.  
       The ambiguities and the “dual standards” of EU minority rights regimes and the accent on 
regionalization policies have enabled the Hungarian ethnic minority in Romania to use “Europe” 
and “integration” as framing devices or vehicles for advancing their domestic demands. By 
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moving the focus of analysis from the state to the ethnic group’s politics, this paper has attempted 
to illustrate how, in order to appeal to their constituency, the leaders of the Hungarian minority – 
both the moderates and the hardliners – have used “Europe” and “European themes” as framing 
devices thereby projecting their identities and group interests within a wider, “European,” 
political space. 
        In the period from 1990 to 2003, the Hungarian minority was able to use the opportunities of 
EU accession process to press for institutionalized language rights. The kin-state, Hungary, was 
always eager to help by “Europeanizing” Hungarian minority’s issues. Since 2003 both the 
moderate and radical factions of the Hungarian minority have framed their domestic discourse in 
terms of EU regionalization policy to press for decentralization and territorial autonomy, 
respectively. While the EU enlargement has offered useful frameworks for the accommodation of 
ethnic groups’ demands after 1990, the EU does not offer definitive solutions to the “nationalities 
question” in the CEE context. 
        At the same time, the final destination of the European integration process is still a matter of 
contention among those who favor a federal European state and those who would prefer a more 
“communitarian type of polity.”
75 Therefore, in an enlarged “Europe of 27,” it remains to be seen 
how successful the strategies of sub-national actors (i.e. minority groups) will prove and how the 
current developments will affect the future shape of the Union.  
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